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O'Bannon v. National Collegiate
Athletic Association: Why the Ninth
Circuit Should Not Block the
Floodgates of Change in College
Athletics
Michael A. Carrier* & Christopher L. Sagers**
Abstract
In O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, then-Chief
Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California issued a groundbreaking decision,
potentially opening the floodgates for challenges to National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) amateurism rules. The
NCAA was finally put to a full evidentiary demonstration of its
amateurism defense, and its proof was found emphatically
wanting. We agree with Professor Edelman that O'Bannon could
bring about significant changes, but only if the Ninth Circuit
affirms. We write mainly to address the NCAA's vigorous pending
appeal and the views of certain amici, and to explain our strong
support for the result at trial. Reversal of Judge Wilken's
comprehensive and thoughtful decision would thwart needed
changes just as colleges are beginning to embrace them and would
be mistaken as a matter of law. O'Bannon is a correct, justifiable,
garden-variety rule-of-reason opinion and should be affirmed by
the Ninth Circuit.
* Distinguished Professor, Rutgers Law School.
** James A. Thomas Distinguished Professor of Law, Cleveland State
University Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. Copyright 0 2015 Michael A.
Carrier & Christopher L. Sagers. Portions of this response are adapted from
Brief for Professors of Antitrust and Sports Law as Amici Curiae in Support of
Appellees, O'Bannon v. NCAA, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2015),
which Sagers principally drafted and Carrier and Marc Edelman signed.
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. Introduction
In O'Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,' then-
Chief Judge Claudia Wilken of the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California issued a groundbreaking decision,
potentially opening the floodgates for challenges to National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) amateurism rules.2 The
NCAA was finally put to a full evidentiary demonstration of its
amateurism defense, and its proof was found emphatically
wanting. O'Bannon is significant as that rarest of antitrust cases:
a rule-of-reason challenge that not only reached the merits, but
also provided a victory for plaintiffs. In his article, Professor Marc
Edelman explains how the decision can be a gateway to more far-
reaching changes in college athletics, which could be attained
through other lawsuits, unionization, or legislation.3
1. 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
2. See id. at 985 (explaining that the plaintiffs challenged NCAA rules
precluding "football players and Division I men's basketball players from
receiving any compensation, beyond the value of their athletic scholarships, for
the use of their names, images, and likenesses in videogames, live game
telecasts, re-broadcasts, and archival game footage").
3. See generally Marc Edelman, The District Court Decision in O'Bannon
v. National Collegiate Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-
Athlete Rights, and a Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WAsH. & LEE L. REV.
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We agree that O'Bannon could bring about those changes,
but only if the Ninth Circuit affirms. We write mainly to address
the NCAA's vigorous pending appeal and the views of certain
amici, and to explain our strong support for the result at trial.
Reversal of Judge Wilken's comprehensive and thoughtful
decision would thwart needed changes just as colleges are
beginning to embrace them and would be mistaken as a matter of
law. One of us has conducted an empirical review of nearly every
rule-of-reason case in the modern era,4 and on the basis of such
analysis, we can comfortably describe O'Bannon as a correct,
justifiable, garden-variety rule-of-reason opinion. A reversal by
the Ninth Circuit, depending on how the opinion is written, could
result in even a robust, well-supported evidentiary presentation
not being enough for plaintiffs to win a rule-of-reason case, even
when the anticompetitive effects are significant, obvious, and not
outweighed by any legitimate justification.
Part II of this response explains why antitrust law applies to
the NCAA's conduct.' Part III contends that the Supreme Court's
decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents does not immunize the
NCAA's action.' Part IV shows why the district court was correct
in finding an antitrust violation. And Part V reveals how the
2319, 2347-48 (2015).
4. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Update for
the 21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 829 (2009) [hereinafter Carrier,
Rule of Reason in 21st Century] (reviewing 222 antitrust cases); Michael A.
Carrier, The Real Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV.
1265, 1272-73 (1999) [hereinafter Carrier, Real Rule of Reason] (reviewing 495
antitrust cases).
5. Infra Part II.
6. Infra Part III.
7. Infra Part IV. This Response does not address the NCAA's "antitrust
injury" argument other than to note that, as plaintiffs have explained, "[t]he
NCAA's current contracts with television and cable networks (under which it
reaps hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue annually) contain express
provisions assigning Plaintiffs' NIL [name, image, and likeness] rights."
Plaintiffs-Appellees' Opposition Brief in Response to National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'ns Opening Appellate Brief at 23, 40, Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n
v. O'Bannon, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2015) [hereinafter
Plaintiffs' Br.] (quoting, in addition, the statement of NCAA executive Oliver
Luck that college athletes have a "fundamental right" to be compensated for use
of their NILs); see also Brief for the National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n at 35-36,
O'Bannon, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Nov. 14, 2014) [hereinafter NCAA
Br.] (making the "antitrust injury" argument by maintaining that there could be
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plaintiffs' framing of the O'Bannon case explains some of the
criticisms of the district court's decision.'
II. Application of Antitrust Law
On its appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the NCAA claims that the
challenged restraints "do not regulate commercial activity and thus
are not within the scope of the Sherman Act."9 It argues that the Act
seeks to "preventH ... restraints to free competition in business and
commercial transactions"10 and that "[t]he NCAA's amateurism rules
do not effect any such restraint.""
But at the same time, the NCAA warns that if it cannot
constrain "the commercial pressures of college sports," then "an
avocation [might] become a profession." 12 In lamenting potential
"commercial pressures," the NCAA concedes that it is engaged in
business and subject to antitrust law. In any event, antitrust courts
are not permitted to entertain such claims about professions. As the
Supreme Court explained a century ago: "[R]estraints of trade
within the purview of the statute . . . [can]not be taken out of that
category by indulging in general reasoning as to the expediency or
non-expediency of having made the contracts .... "13
In the case on which the NCAA most directly relies, NCAA v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,14 the Supreme
Court made clear that "the NCAA and its member institutions
are . . . organized to maximize revenues' and are "[no] less likely to
restrict output [to maximize profit] . . . than would be a for-profit
entity."" With modern college athletics generating billions of dollars
each year, this is even truer today than it was when the Court
decided the case thirty years ago. 6
no application of the rules "that would deprive plaintiffs of NIL compensation").
8. Infra Part V.
9. NCAA Br., supra note 7, at 32.
10. Id. (quoting Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 493 (1940)).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2.
13. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911).
14. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
15. Id. at 101 n.22.
16. See Revenue, NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC AsS'N,
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There is no good reason why antitrust law cannot apply to the
NCAA. Antitrust applies without limitation to sports in general.17 It
applies to higher education." And it applies to non-profit
organizations.19 Just as colleges that conspire on scholarships must
face antitrust scrutiny, 20 so too must colleges that limit payment for
student athletes.
III. No Antitrust Immunity
The NCAA also attempts to evade antitrust scrutiny by
claiming that Board of Regents gives it a special immunity,
rendering its amateurism rules "procompetitive and therefore
valid under the Sherman Act as a matter of law."21 And it
maintains that "even if college sports has changed so
dramatically since Board of Regents that the Supreme Court's
analysis no longer holds, the district court (and this Court) would
still be bound by the decision."22
We think such a precedent of immunity would be a peculiar
role for Board of Regents. The Court there found an antitrust
violation from an NCAA plan that limited the number of college
football games that could be televised and the number of games
in which a single team could appear.23 The Court found that "[t]he
anticompetitive consequences of th[e] arrangement [we]re
apparent" because "[p]rice is higher and output lower than they
would otherwise be H and both are unresponsive to consumer
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/finances/revenue (last visited Feb. 5, 2015)
(explaining that "college athletics programs annually generate about $6.1 billion
from ticket sales, radio and television receipts, alumni contributions,
guarantees, royalties and NCAA distributions") (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
17. See generally Int'l Boxing Club of N.Y. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242,
252 (1959).
18. See generally United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 665-66 (3d Cir.
1993).
19. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101 n.22.
20. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 679.
21. NCAA Br., supra note 7, at 14.
22. Id. at 28.
23. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. at 94.
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preference."24 Moreover, the Court found a violation under an
abbreviated analysis that relieved plaintiffs of the need to show
market power, as "the absence of proof of market power does not
justify a naked restriction on price or output."2 5 Nor would any
"good motives ... validate an otherwise anticompetitive
practice."26
Indeed, in Board of Regents itself, "the NCAA [did] not rely[
on amateurism as a procompetitive justification," and its counsel
admitted during oral argument that it "might be able to get more
viewers . . . if it had semi-professional clubs rather than amateur
clubs." 2 7 Separately, even if there were anything to the purported
immunity, Judge Wilken found "ample evidence ... that the
college sports industry has changed substantially in the thirty
years since Board of Regents was decided."28
But most fundamentally, Board of Regents analyzed-and
invalidated-rules relating to television broadcast rights that had
nothing to do with athlete pay. Its statements about amateurism
were plainly, obviously, dicta. Such dicta cannot overcome the
results of a fully litigated trial that exhaustively considered the
amateurism defense. The district court largely rejected the
NCAA's amateurism claims "after hearing the testimony of 23
witnesses and considering 287 exhibits" in a "15-day bench trial
that produced a transcript of 3,395 pages and a written decision
of 99 pages."29
The NCAA grasps for the reed of Board of Regents, but a
sentence of dicta does not displace an entire trial on the very
issue of amateurism in which the court unmistakably found that
the defense did not justify the challenged restraints.3 0
24. Id. at 106-07.
25. Id. at 109.
26. Id. at 101 n.23.
27. O'Bannon v. Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999
(N.D. Cal. 2014).
28. Id. at 999-1000; see also Plaintiffs Br., supra note 7, at 13 (quoting
statement on NCAA's website that "[a]s the scale of both revenue generation
and spending has increased over the last few decades, there is a general sense
that 'big time' athletics is in conflict with the principle of amateurism").
29. Plaintiffs Br., supra note 7, at 2.
30. The NCAA's reading of Board of Regents also is precluded by Ninth
Circuit law. In Hairston v. Pacific 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1319 (9th Cir.
1996), the Ninth Circuit applied a full rule-of-reason analysis to a factually
304
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IV. Rule of Reason
A. Framework
The district court's opinion fits comfortably into hornbook rule-
of-reason analysis. Courts relying on this framework engage in a
burden-shifting analysis.3 1 First, plaintiffs must show a significant
anticompetitive effect.3 2  Second, defendants must offer a
procompetitive justification for the restraint.33 Third, the plaintiff
can show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary to attain the
defendant's objectives or that there are less restrictive alternatives
to achieving the goals.3 4 The final stage of the analysis involves
balancing anticompetitive and procompetitive effects.3 5
Of crucial importance, the effect of not making the showings at
the various stages varies. If the plaintiff cannot show an
anticompetitive effect, it loses because there is no harm to
competition.36 And if the defendant cannot show a procompetitive
justification, it loses because it cannot offer a reason for the
restraint.3 7
In the third stage, in contrast (and based on a review of nearly
every rule-of-reason case in the modern era),3 8 if the plaintiff does
not show that the restraint is not reasonably necessary or that there
are less restrictive alternatives, it does not lose. A plaintiffs showing
at this stage typically allows it to win the case outright, avoiding a
balancing analysis. After all, if the plaintiff could show that the
indistinguishable restraint involving penalties for the violation of amateurism
rules. It did so without discussing presumptions or special rules, and it cited
Board of Regents as authority for its decision. Id. at 1318-19; see also Tanaka v.
Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying rule of reason
to restraint on student-athlete transfers among conference member schools).
31. See generally Carrier, Real Rule of Reason, supra note 4, at 1268-69.
32. See, e.g., Capital Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996
F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993).
33. See, e.g., id.
34. See, e.g., id.
35. See generally Carrier, Real Rule of Reason, supra note 4, at 1268-69.
36. Id. at 1268.
37. Id.
38. See generally Carrier, Rule of Reason in 21st Century, supra note 4. The
surveys included every rule-of-reason case that a court decided from June 23,
1977 to May 5, 2009. More recent cases do not alter the conclusions in the text.
See generally Carrier, Real Rule of Reason, supra note 4.
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restraint is not reasonably necessary to attain the defendant's
objective, it could be struck down. And if there is a less restrictive
alternative that would allow a defendant to achieve its objective,
then that alternative should be used because it allows the defendant
to obtain its goals while being less restrictive of competition.39
B. Anticompetitive Effect
Judge Wilken first found that the plaintiffs demonstrated an
anticompetitive effect. She found that NCAA Division I schools
"compete to sell unique bundles of goods and services to elite football
and basketball recruits" and that they "fixed the price of their
product by agreeing not to offer any recruit a share of the licensing
revenues derived from the use of his name, image, and likeness
[(NIL)] ."40 The restraint caused anticompetitive harm sufficient to
satisfy plaintiffs' initial burden because, "in [its] absence ... ,
certain schools would compete for recruits by offering them a lower
price for the opportunity to play [elite sports] while they attend
college." 4 1 That injury is sufficient "even if [it did] not ultimately
harm consumers," as many courts have recognized such claims in
the context of "market[s] for athletic services." 42 On appeal, the
NCAA quibbles with this conclusion on several grounds, focusing
among other things on output reductions and claims that de minimis
price-fixing effects are acceptable. 43 We think the court's finding is
well founded, and in any event not clearly erroneous.
C. Procompetitive Justification
39. See Cnty. of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1160 (9th
Cir. 2001) ("Because plaintiffs have failed to meet their burden of advancing
viable less restrictive alternatives, we reach the balancing stage."); Carrier, Real
Rule of Reason, supra note 4, at 1343-44.
40. O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 986, 989
(N.D. Cal. 2014).
41. Id. at 988.
42. Id. at 991-92.
43. NCAA Br., supra note 7, at 47 (arguing that challenged rules "would
have a de minimis effect in the relevant market because they would limit only
one minor (or non-existent) component of the bundle [of goods and services to
athletic recruits], while competition in the overall relevant market remains
robust").
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Once the plaintiffs made this showing, the burden shifted to the
defendant to offer procompetitive justifications for its restraint. The
district court rejected two of the NCAA's four justifications:
preserving competitive balance and increasing "output."4 4 It did not
completely reject the other two-promoting amateurism and
integrating student-athletes into their campus communities-but,
crucially, found them too insignificant to justify the challenged
restraint: a complete ban on NIL revenues. 45
The most direct threat to the NCAA in future proceedings is the
loss of the amateurism justification, a prized defense on which it has
relied for decades. The district court found that its rules were
"malleable" and had changed "numerous times." 46 And though the
NCAA had the benefit of a full trial and substantial evidentiary
demonstration, it failed to show that amateurism could "justify the
rigid prohibition on compensating student-athletes . . . with any
share of licensing revenue generated from the use of their [NILs] ."47
Similarly, the NCAA's restrictions on NIL payments were not
necessary to integrate student-athletes into their schools' academic
communities. 48 The NCAA could not "use this goal to justify its
sweeping prohibition on any student-athlete compensation . . . from
licensing revenue generated from the use of student-athletes'
[NILs] ."4
In short, the court found that the NCAA (1) could not use two of
its four proposed justifications and (2) could not rely on the other two
to support the restrictions at issue in the case. 0 In other words, the
plaintiffs demonstrated an anticompetitive effect, but the NCAA
failed to offer justifications to explain its restriction.5 1 As a result,
the anticompetitive effects predominated and the plaintiffs proved a
successful rule-of-reason case. At that point, the court's decision on
liability was over.
44. O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1001-02, 1003-04. As for "increased
output," the NCAA argued that its rules provided colleges and elite student
athletes more opportunities to participate in sports. Id. at 1003-04.
45. Id. at 1000-01, 1003.
46. Id. at 1000.
47. Id. at 1001.
48. Id. at 1003.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1000-04.
51. Id. at 1005.
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D. Less Restrictive Alternatives
To be sure, the court did not stop there. It crafted a remedy to
address the anticompetitive harm and, in doing so, considered
several alternatives that were less restrictive of competition but still
could have achieved the NCAA's objectives.5 2 What is key, however,
is that the plaintiffs did not need to show such alternatives to
succeed under the rule of reason. Their ability to offer less restrictive
alternatives would help them win under the rule of reason. But such
an offering is not necessary. A plaintiffs showing of anticompetitive
effects, together with a defendant's failure to offer procompetitive
justifications that would outweigh these effects, is enough for a
plaintiff to win.53
On this point, the amicus brief filed by Wilson Sonsini Goodrich
& Rosati, P.C. on behalf of fifteen professors is not persuasive. The
brief argues that "the Court should be able to conclude that the
procompetitive benefits outweigh any alleged competitive harms
without elaborate analysis" because promoting amateurism and
integration of student athletes "are at the core of the NCAA's
mission" and that the plaintiffs "failed to identify a substantially less
restrictive alternative to capping payments to players for promoting
those aims."5 4 Regardless of what the NCAA views as the core of its
mission, the district court found that these justifications were barely
acceptable and certainly did not justify the restraints in this case.5
52. See id. at 1005-06 (noting that "the NCAA could permit ... schools to
award stipends to student-athletes up to the full cost of attendance" and "permit
its schools to hold in trust limited and equal shares of its licensing revenue to be
distributed to its student-athletes after they leave college").
53. The NCAA and supporting amici spend a good deal of attention on the
issue of less restrictive alternatives. See NCAA Br., supra note 7, at 54-60
(devoting six pages to the issue); Brief for Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in
Support of Appellant at 8-16, O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, Nos.
14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Nov. 21, 2014) [hereinafter Wilson Sonsini Br.]
(devoting nine pages to the issue). But (1) district courts enjoy broad remedial
discretion in antitrust, (2) the court adopted a remedy recommended by
plaintiffs, and (3) the NCAA waived any challenge to the remedy. See Brief for
Professors of Antitrust and Sports Law as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellees
at 18, O'Bannon, Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068 (9th Cir. Jan. 28, 2015) [hereinafter
Robins Kaplan Br.] (discussing these points).
54. Wilson Sonsini Br., supra note 53, at 13-14.
55. See O'Bannon v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 986,
1000-04 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
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In addition, even if plaintiffs were not able to demonstrate a less
restrictive alternative, that is not grounds for a plaintiff loss. It
merely requires the court to balance anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects. And though it performed this balancing
quickly, the O'Bannon court did just that in finding for the
plaintiffs.s6
V. Framing of the O'Bannon Case
Finally, we take minor issue with one point in Professor
Edelman's essay, which reflects a larger frustration with the
O'Bannon litigation. While Professor Edelman supports Judge
Wilken's analysis, he faults her remedy.s7 He is not alone, and other
supporters of plaintiffs have made similar complaints. 8 Professor
Edelman contends that the court should "simply [have] enjoined the
NCAA's restraints outright," by which he means it could have
"entirely enjoined [its] 'no pay' restraints," "simply recogniz[ing]
56. While the court found that amateurism "play[s] a limited role in driving
consumer demand" for college sports that "might justify a restriction on large
payments," that rationale "[could] not justify the rigid prohibition on
compensating student-athletes . . . with any share of licensing revenue."
O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1001. The court likewise found that integration of
student-athletes into their campus communities could improve the education
product they receive, but held that the NCAA's outright ban was "[not]
necessary to achieve these benefits." Id. at 1003. For that reason, while
"[1]imited restrictions on student-athlete compensation may help schools achieve
this narrow procompetitive goal[,] ... the NCAA may not use this goal ... to
justify its sweeping prohibition on any student-athlete compensation ... from
licensing revenue." Id. Finally, the NCAA's argument that the district court's
"ill-conceived rule-of-reason analysis amounted to little more than asking
whether college sports could still be commercially popular if it became
something different from what it has long been," NCAA Br., supra note 7, at 60,
is a red herring that ignores the court's crediting of anticompetitive effects and
failure to find justifications that would outweigh these antitrust harms.
57. See Edelman, supra note 3, at 2343 (arguing that the court's injunction
was "limited and weak, as it failed to ameliorate the NCAA's anticompetitive
practices as effectively as possible").
58. See, e.g., Stephen F. Ross & Wayne S. DeSarbo, A Rapid Reaction to
O'Bannon: The Need for Analytics in Applying the Sherman Act to Overly
Restrictive Joint Venture Schemes, 119 PENN ST. L. REV. PENN STATIM 43, 50-59
(2015), http://www.pennstatelawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/A-
Rapid-Reaction-to-O.pdf ("Judge Wilken ... invented a remedy of a $5,000
annual cash payment to be held in trust" even though her "own antitrust
analysis d[id] not support that decision.").
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that . . . [its] long-standing restraints on college-athlete pay far
exceeded any alleged procompetitive justifications."5 9
We think that is unlikely. Antitrust courts have broad remedial
discretion,6 0 but they tend not to award relief without evidentiary
support.1 In this litigation, plaintiffs pled as their only injury the
denial of revenue from NIL rights,6 2 and they tried the case
accordingly. Aside from whether courts can or commonly do enter
remedies substantially larger than plaintiffs themselves request, the
record may well have been insufficient to support Professor
Edelman's desired remedy. Reversal of O'Bannon would be
regrettable on any ground, including that of reaching beyond the
plaintiffs' case to award a remedy unsupported in the record.
That said, we can understand Professor Edelman's impatience.
The emphasis in O'Bannon on NIL revenues explains the decision's
weaknesses. If the plaintiffs had litigated O'Bannon in broader
terms, they could have won more significant relief, and could have
simplified a complex case and a complex verdict. For example,
pleading the case as a simple, labor-market monopsony63 would have
obviated the court's complicated analysis of harm in "group
licensing" markets64 and would have deflected some of the NCAA's
red herrings, like its First Amendment defense and claims on
antitrust injury.6 5
59. Edelman, supra note 3, at 2343-44.
60. See 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
801-02 (7th ed. 2012).
61. See id.
62. See Complaint at 62-68, O'Bannon v. Nat'1 Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 7
F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (No. CV-09-3329).
63. Indeed, two subsequent lawsuits are already pending before Judge
Wilken that more directly challenge the no-pay model. See Complaint at 2,
Jenkins v. NCAA, 3:14-cv-01678-FLW-LHG (D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2014) (seeking to
overturn NCAA rules "placing a ceiling on the compensation that may be paid to
[college] athletes for their services"); Complaint at 1, 3, Alston v. NCAA, 3:14-cv-
01011-CW (N.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2014) (characterizing athletes as "essentially
working full-time football jobs" and seeking to enjoin "the present NCAA Bylaw
that limits financial aid to the presently-defined [limits]"). The Alston case was
filed in the Northern District of California and initially assigned to Judge
Wilken, and both Jenkins and Alston have been transferred to a multi-district
litigation docket pending before her, styled In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid
Cap Antitrust Litig., 4:14-md-02541-CW (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2014).
64. See O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 993-99.
65. For critiques of these arguments, see supra note 7 and Robins Kaplan
Br., supra note 53, at 3 n.4. We do not criticize plaintiffs' counsel for taking the
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But a larger point is that none of this is relevant to the matter
at hand. Judge Wilken's decision was appropriate to the case as it
was pled and tried and was supported by the record. While we can
sympathize with Professor Edelman's desire for a more robust
remedy, no one can doubt the significance of the liability finding and
the role this can play in future developments that could result in
more expansive remedies.
VI. Conclusion
Professor Edelman is correct that O'Bannon can be a building
block for future efforts to increase student-athletes' ability to recover
revenues from their labors. But that will only come to pass if the
district court's decision is upheld. If the Ninth Circuit overturns the
fully supported ruling, that moment will be gone, and college
athletes will have lost their opportunity to be compensated for the
NCAA's antitrust violations.
approach they took, which likely reflected the interests of named plaintiff Ed
O'Bannon, who was frustrated when he saw his own likeness in a video game,
see Transcript at 26-27, O'Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955 (No. CV-09-3329)
(testimony of Edward O'Bannon, explaining his initial motivation to sue), as
well as the views of long-time Nike executive and basketball organizer Sonny
Vaccaro, who largely initiated the litigation. See Jon Solomon, How Sonny
Vaccaro Accidentally Created the Ed O'Bannon Case, CBSSPORTS.COM, (June 6,
2014), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24581965/ho
w-sonny-vaccaro-accidentally-created-the-ed-obannon-case (last visited Feb. 16,
2015) (explaining the evolution of the O'Bannon trial strategy) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review). Practical considerations may have counseled
against the simpler, more aggressive strategy, as O'Bannon (even though it led
to a series of amateurism challenges) had few predecessors at the time it was
filed and litigated. See id. (asking whether courts were "ready for this suit");
supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing pending subsequent lawsuits
that more directly challenge the no-pay model).
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